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Seth Gershenson
Did No Child Left Behind 
Affect Teacher Attendance? 
Evidence from North Carolina
Attaching incentives to students’ 
performance on standardized exams has 
the potential to alleviate the principal-
agent problem inherent in the relationship 
between stakeholders and schools, 
improve student achievement, and 
reduce the costs of public education. 
Indeed, this is the motivation behind the 
state-level consequential accountability 
policies introduced in the 1990s and the 
2001 passage of the federal No Child 
Left Behind Act (NCLB).1 The effi cacy 
of such policies is central to the current 
debate surrounding the reauthorization of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act, under which NCLB was fi rst passed. 
Consequential accountability policies 
are typically associated with modest, 
statistically signifi cant increases in 
student achievement ranging from 10 
to 30 percent of a test-score standard 
deviation (Figlio and Loeb 2011). 
However, critics contend that these 
test-score gains are illusory and refl ect 
strategic responses by schools rather 
than true learning gains. Evidence of 
strategic responses to the incentives 
provided by consequential accountability 
policies runs the gamut from the 
relatively innocuous (e.g., “narrowing of 
the curriculum”) to the nefarious (e.g., 
explicit teacher cheating). As a result, the 
mechanisms through which consequential 
accountability policies affect academic 
achievement are not entirely understood, 
but they have implications for the design 
of future education policies and the 
public sector performance standards 
movement more generally. 
Increased teacher effort is one 
potential mechanism through which 
consequential accountability policies 
might improve student achievement, 
as teachers play a critical role in the 
educational process. Teacher attendance 
measures one dimension of teacher 
effort that is known to affect student 
achievement.2 Moreover, teacher 
absences are fi nancially costly and create 
negative externalities by infl uencing 
the attendance of their peers. This 
article is based on a recent Upjohn 
Institute Working Paper (Gershenson 
[2015]; see http://research.upjohn.org/
up_workingpapers/217/) that examines 
one potential mechanism through 
which consequential accountability 
policies affect student achievement by 
considering how, if at all, the threat of 
sanctions associated with failing to meet 
NCLB’s performance standards affected 
teacher absence rates in North Carolina. 
Accountability Pressure in Early Years 
of NCLB
NCLB required all schools to make 
adequate yearly progress (AYP), which 
included meeting percent profi cient, 
attendance, and test-participation 
thresholds both overall and for specifi c 
subgroups of the student population. 
Furthermore, the act mandated additional 
sanctions (e.g., restructuring and state 
takeover) on Title 1 schools that failed 
to make AYP in consecutive years. The 
subsequent discussion focuses on Title 1 
schools, as they comprise the majority of 
North Carolina’s public primary schools, 
and the threat of sanctions there was 
particularly salient.
In 2004, teachers in schools that 
failed to make AYP in 2003 (the fi rst 
year of NCLB) were under considerably 
more pressure than their counterparts in 
schools that made AYP in 2003, as the 
former were in schools at risk of failing 
to make AYP for two consecutive school 
years.3 Thus, teachers in schools that 
failed to make AYP in 2003 compose the 
treatment group, while their counterparts 
in schools that made AYP in 2003 
compose the control group. However, 
a simple comparison between the 2004 
attendance records of teachers in the 
treatment and control groups is unlikely 
to provide a valid estimate of the effect 
of failing to make AYP on teacher 
absences, as the treatment (i.e., failing 
to make AYP in 2003) was not randomly 
assigned to schools. Specifi cally, the 
schools that failed to make AYP in 2003 
might systematically differ from their 
counterparts that made AYP in 2003 in 
both observable and unobservable ways. 
Main Results
That problem can be avoided using a 
difference-in-differences (DD) strategy 
that uses data from 2003 to control for 
preexisting differences between treatment 
and control schools. The method’s name 
comes from the fact that in its simplest 
form, the DD estimate is simply the 
difference between two differences: the 
difference in average annual absences 
between treatment and control schools, 
between 2003 and 2004. Table 1 presents 
the sample averages used to compute the 
DD estimate of the effect of failing to 
make AYP on annual teacher absences. 
The DD point estimate of −1.25, which 
is strongly statistically signifi cant, 
suggests that on average teachers in 
schools that failed to make AYP in 2003 
took 1.25 fewer absences in 2004. To 
put this number in perspective, note that 
the average teacher was absent about 
8.7 times per year, so 1.25 represents a 
Table 1  Mean Annual Teacher Absences
NOTE: N = 8,080 teacher-years. The standard error of the difference-in-differences estimate of 
−1.25, which is robust to clustering at the school level, is 0.43. ***p < 0.01.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the North Carolina Education Research Data 
Center.
Year School failed in 2003 School passed in 2003 Difference
2004 7.97 8.97 −1.00
2003 9.01 8.76 0.25
Difference −1.04 0.21 −1.25***
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14 percent decrease. The DD estimate 
remains similar in magnitude when the 
sample is restricted to teachers who did 
not change schools between 2003 and 
2004, which suggests that the effect of 
sanctions associated with failing AYP 
on teacher absences is driven by within-
teacher changes in behavior, not by 
changes in the composition of schools’ 
teaching staffs. The decrease is even 
larger among more effective teachers 
who attended selective undergraduate 
institutions and who have higher value-
added measures of effectiveness.
More sophisticated regression-based 
DD estimators that control for observed 
teacher qualifi cations, observed school 
characteristics, school fi xed effects, 
teacher fi xed effects, and school-specifi c 
time trends yield similarly sized, 
statistically signifi cant estimates ranging 
from about −1.0 to −1.6. These results 
suggest that the main results are not 
driven by changes in the student bodies 
of “treatment” schools relative to those 
of “control” schools between 2003 and 
2004. The DD estimate presented in 
Table 1 is similarly robust to the way in 
which teacher absences are measured. 
For example, the analogous DD estimate 
of the effect of accountability pressure on 
the likelihood that a teacher is absent 15 
or more times per school year is −0.03, 
which represents a 30 percent decline.
Sensitivity Analysis
The DD estimates discussed above 
are suggestive of a causal effect of 
failing AYP in 2003, and the resulting 
increase in accountability pressure, on 
teachers’ 2004 attendance. However, the 
validity of DD estimates hinges on the 
“common trends” assumption that there 
was no preexisting differential trend 
in teacher absences in treated schools 
(i.e., schools that failed AYP in 2003). 
This assumption is easily tested in an 
event-study framework using several 
years of data prior to the passage of 
NCLB. Intuitively, the event-study model 
includes placebo “treatment effects” 
of failing AYP in 2003 on absences in 
prior years. Event-study estimates, using 
data from 1997 to 2004, are depicted in 
Figure 1. The bars represent the effect of 
failing AYP in 2003 on annual teacher 
absences in each year from 1998 onward. 
If the common trends assumption 
holds—that is, there is no preexisting 
differential trend in the treated schools—
the 1998–2003 interaction terms should 
be statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. Indeed, this is exactly what we see 
in Figure 1, as each of the 95 percent 
confi dence intervals includes zero. 
However, in 2004, the year in which we 
expect to see an effect of failing AYP in 
2003, the estimated effect is about −1.10 
and statistically signifi cantly different 
from zero. This is in line with the DD 
estimates discussed above and provides 
further evidence that the DD estimate 
presented in Table 1 can be given a causal 
interpretation.
Conclusion
The estimated effect of performance 
standards on teacher absences is 
consistent with previous research on 
the malleability of teacher effort, as 
Ahn (2013) and Jacob (2013) fi nd 
evidence that teacher effort, as measured 
by teacher absences, responds to 
incentives. Moreover, the magnitudes of 
the effects discussed above are similar 
to those of the estimated effects of a 
policy change in Chicago that granted 
principals the discretion to dismiss 
probationary teachers (Jacob 2013). 
Finally, the estimates reported here likely 
underestimate the total effect of NCLB’s 
accountability pressure on teacher effort, 
as NCLB placed pressure on all schools, 
including those that made AYP in 2003, 
and attendance only represents one 
dimension of effort.
The results discussed here have at 
least three implications for education 
policy and for public-sector performance 
standards more generally. First, that 
teacher absences declined in response 
to increased accountability pressure 
suggests that one mechanism through 
which consequential accountability 
policies affect student achievement is 
through increased teacher effort. Second, 
these results contribute to the growing 
body of evidence that teacher effort, as 
measured by absences, responds to both 
school- and individual-level incentives. 
In particular, salient incentives associated 
with school-level academic performance 
can alter individual teacher behaviors. 
Finally, the heterogeneity in teachers’ 
responses to the threat of sanctions 
suggests potential benefi ts to policy 
designs and teacher training programs 
that account for such differences. For 
example, to the extent that teachers in 
tested and nontested grades responded 
differently to the threat of sanctions, 
NOTE: 95% confi dence intervals, which are robust to clustering at the school level, are reported.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the North Carolina Education Research Data 
Center.
Figure 1  Event-Study Estimates, 1997–2004
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standard labor economic theory suggests 
that if jobs in tested grades are more 
stressful, such jobs can pay compensating 
differentials. The differentials need not be 
monetary and could instead be provided 
in the form of additional planning 
periods, teaching aids, mentorship, or 
professional development. Similarly, that 
the increase in effort was particularly 
strong among more effective teachers 
suggests that providing additional support 
to less effective teachers may be helpful, 
particularly for teachers and schools 
subject to increased accountability 
pressure.
Notes
1. See Figlio and Loeb (2011) for a 
thorough review of such policies.
2. For example, Herrmann and Rockoff 
(2012) provide persuasive evidence that 
teacher absences in New York City’s public 
schools harmed student achievement.
3. Years refer to the spring semester of 
academic years, so 2003 refers to the 2002–
2003 academic year.
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